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CLASSIFICATION OF REAL PROPERTY
FOR TAX PURPOSES IN ILLINOIS-
HOFFMANN V. CLARK
Real property taxes traditionally have been levied to raise revenue for
local government by taxing all real estate uniformly. Uniform taxation is
achieved by applying a single tax rate to the property's fair market value'
regardless of the property's use. 2  In enacting real property taxes for rev-
enue purposes, legislatures have attempted to impose an equal tax burden
on each taxpayer to avoid influencing private sector decision-making. 3 Ac-
cordingly, the ideal property tax has been neutral in its impact. Moreover,
to insure an equitable tax, each taxpayer was to receive benefits proportion-
ate to the tax liability incurred.4 Recently, however, real property taxation
has been employed to achieve non-revenue goals 5 such as subsidizing
selected taxpayers by shifting their tax burden to others 6 and influencing
private sector decision-making by decreasing the tax burden on property
used for socially desirable purposes. 7  Thus, in contrast to the traditional
method of taxing property at a uniform tax rate applied to its fair market
value, this new taxation scheme is purposely non-neutral.8 In attempting to
achieve these non-revenue goals, legislatures have first classified the real
estate and then levied a tax non-uniformly by property class. 9
1. Fair market value is the price a willing buyer would pay for the property to a willing
seller. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 716 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
2. S. BENSON, THE AMERICAN PROPERTY TAX: ITS HISTORY, ADMINISTRATION, AND
ECONOMIC IMPACT 34-35 (1965) [hereinafter cited as BENSON]; S. LELAND, THE CLASSIFIED
PROPERTY TAX IN THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (1928) [hereinafter cited as LELAND].
3. W. ATTOE, T. HELLER & J. MORGAN, TAXATION AND LAND USE: A SEARCH FOR
GOALS 2 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ATTOE]. See BENSON, supra note 2, at 32-34. By the
beginning of the nineteenth century, the idea of equality of taxation had become a basic princi-
ple. Equality of taxation was viewed as the means to distribute the burdens of government
justly, so that the weight of taxation rested equally on all. (d.
4. 0. ECKSTEIN, PUBLIC FINANCE 59 (1967). Eckstein calls this criteria of equality the
"benefit principle."
5. ATToE, supra note 3, at 2.
6. ATroE, supra note 3, at 24; R. HATFIELD, GOVERNOR'S MINNESOTA PROPERTY TAX
STUDY 11-27 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HATFIELD]. Hatfield's comprehensive study was pre-
pared with the assistance of the Governor's Property Tax Committee. The study includes a
thorough discussion of property tax classification in Minnesota.
7. See H. LADD, TAX POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING PREFERENTIAL TAX TREAT-
MENT OF OPEN SPACE AND AGRICULTURAL LANDS 6-7 (1978). Mimeographed paper prepared
for the Conference on the Preferential Tax Treatment of Agricultural Lands held at the Lincoln
Institute of Land Policy, June 12 and 13 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LADD]; See also E.
STENEHJEM, THE FEASIBILITY OF PROMOTING SPECIFIC LAND USE OBJECTIVES THROUGH THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIC TAX POLICIES 16-17 (1975) [hereinafter cited as STENEHJEM].
8. ArrOE, supra note 3, at 2.
9. To date twenty-three states have either constitutional or legislative provisions allowing
classification of real property for tax purposes. Such classification systems fall into one or a
combination of the following three types: (1) taxation by use value as opposed to fair market
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Such classification is not new to Illinois. The 1870 Illinois Constitution
prohibited classification and required that all real property be assessed uni-
formly for tax purposes. 10 However, de facto classification in the form of
over- or under-assessment of property as a class was often reported " and
litigated. 12 Legalizing de facto classification, particularly in Cook County,
was a central concern at the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention.1 3  As a
result, the 1970 Illinois Constitution allowed counties with a population of
more than 200,000 to enact ordinances classifying property for tax pur-
value; (2) differential assessment by ratio (property is assessed at the same rate but at a different
fraction of market value depending on its use); (3) assessment at a uniform fraction of market
value but application of different tax rates to the assessed value. Interview with Richard Almy,
Director of Research and Technical Services of the International Association of Assessing Offi-
cers, in Chicago, Illinois (August 4, 1978).
Nine states have comprehensive classification systems: Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 40, § 8-1
(1975); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 42-136, 42-227 (Supp. 1978); Hawaii, HAW. REV.. STAT. 9
246-10 to 246-12.3 (Supp. 1977); Louisiana, LA. CONST. art. 7, § 18 (1977); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 273.13 (West Supp. 1977); Montana, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 84-301-
301.21 (Supp. 1977); South Carolina, S.C. CONST. art. X, § 1; Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §
67-611 (1976); West Virginia, W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
Fourteen states have partial classification systems which contain provisions for classifying real
property: California, addition of art. XIII A by initiative measure, June 6, 1978, 1978 Cal.
Legis. Serv. XXV; Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-1-103 (Supp. 1976); Florida, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 193.461 (West Supp. 1978); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 501a-1-105e
(Supp. 1977); Kentucky, Ky. CONST., § 172a; Maine, ME. CONST. art. IX, § 8; ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 36, §§ 563, 1101-1118 (1965); Missouri, MO. CONST. art. IX, § 7; Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
137.019-137.026, 254.090 (Supp. 1978); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-277.2-
105-278 (Supp. 1977); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5713.30-5713.99 (Page Supp. 1978);
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 321.357 (1977); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-5-12 (1971);
South Dakota, S.D. CONST. art. XI, § 2, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 10-6-31-10-6-35.4
(Supp. 1978); Virginia, VA. CODE §§ 58.759.1-58.759.2, 58.769.6-58.779 (Supp. 1978); Wis-
consin, Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 70.32-70.325 (Supp. 1978). See generally INTER-
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, CLASSIFIED PROPERTY TAX SYSTEMS IN THE
U.S. (1977).
10. See J. FISHBANE & G. FISHER, POLITICS OF THE PURSE: REVENUE AND FINANCE IN
THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 71 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FISHBANE];
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., THE FISCAL PROBLEM IN ILLINOIS 67
(1927).
11. FISHBANE, supra note 10, at 71-72; LELAND, supra note 2, at 20; Netsch, Article IX
Revenue, 52 CHI. B. REc. 103, 108 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Netsch]; WATTLING, Taxation of
Real Prcperty in Cook County-The "Railroad Cases" and the Future of DeFacto Classifica-
tion, 1 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 212 (1968). Wattling states that Illinois counties assessed
railroad property at its full value and assessed other property at only a portion of its full market
value (55% or less). Id. at 235.
12. From 1961-1967 the Illinois Supreme Court struck down assessment of railroads at full
value because other property within the county was being assessed at less than full value. See
Korzen v. Belt Ry., 37 I11. 2d 158, 226 N.E.2d 265 (1967); Musso v. Chicago Burlington &
Quincy R.R., 33 Ill. 2d 88, 210 N.E.2d 196 (1965); Korzen v. Chicago Burlington & Quincy
R.R. Co., 32 Il1. 2d 554, 209 N.E.2d 649 (1965); Enrietta v. Gulf Mobile & 0. R.R., 29 Ill. 2d
605, 195 N.E.2d 174 (1964); Wenzel v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 28 Ill. 2d 205, 190 N.E.2d 780
(1963); Kohorst v. Gulf Mobile & 0. R.R., 22 Ill. 2d 104, 174 N.E.2d 182 (1961); Hillison v.
Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R., 22 Ill. 2d 88, 174 N.E.2d 175 (1961).
13. 3 Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention Proceedings 1892-93 (1969-70) [hereinafter
cited as Proceedings].
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poses. 14 The trend toward real property tax classification continued with
the farmland use provision1 5 which was added to the 1939 Revenue Act by
the General Assembly.
The farmland use provision directs assessors in counties with populations
of more than 200,000 to value agricultural property on the basis of its use
valuation, rather than on its fair market value, 16 by estimating the price such
property would bring at a voluntary sale for farming or agricultural uses. In
1973, the provision was amended to apply to all counties regardless of popu-
lation. 1 7  To qualify for farmland use valuation, the person liable for the
taxes must file an application with the county assessor each year in which
the valuation is desired.18 When the property is no longer used for agricul-
tural or farming purposes, the person liable for taxes must pay three years'
rollback taxes (the difference between the taxes actually paid in each of the
three preceding years and what those taxes would have been if computed on
the fair market value of the land) together with five percent interest.19 The
constitutional validity of the farmland use provision was addressed in
Hoffmann v. Clark, 20 in which the Illinois Supreme Court held that the 1970
Illinois Constitution did not limit the General Assembly's power to classify
real estate for property tax purposes.
The purpose of this Note is threefold. First, it will challenge the court's
reasoning and analysis while discussing the impact of the decision on prop-
erty tax classification in Illinois. It will also examine the effectiveness of
property tax classification both as a method of subsidy and as a means of
influencing private sector decision-making. Finally, the Note will explore
possible alternatives to land classification.
THE DECISION
The action in Hoffmann was brought by landowners in DuPage County
who were assessed rollback tax bills on property which previously had been
assessed at its farmland use value. In each case the rollback tax bill was
triggered by at least one of the following factors:21 agricultural use of the
14. ILL. CONST. art IX, § 4(b). See FISHBANE, supra note 10, at 73-4; Netsch, supra note
11, at 108.
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 501a-1 to 501a-3 (1971).
16. Use valuation is the valuation of land by its use, as opposed to the price a willing buyer
would pay to a willing seller. While a willing buyer may bid based on the development value of
the land, use valuation does not account for development value. The use value may be deter-
mined in several ways. For example, some states estimate use value of farmland according to
land productivity. Those states use land value tables which have been constructed on the basis
of productivity ratings. For a full discussion of this topic, see Keene, Differential Assessment
and the Preservation of Open Space, 14 URB. L. ANN. 11, 31 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Keene].
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501a-1 (1973).
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501a-I (1976).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501a-3 (1976).
20. 69 I11. 2d 402, 372 N.E.2d 74 (1977).
21. See Trial testimony of both the Deputy Supervisor of Assessments and the Officer in
charge of agricultural applications for the Supervisor of Assessments. Brief for appellee at 20.
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property ceased; 22 an inspection revealed a non-agricultural use; 23 or the
yearly application was not found or filed. 24  The plaintiffs contended 25 that
the farmland use valuation constituted a legislative classification of real estate
for purposes of taxation in violation of sections 4(a) and (b) of the Illinois
Constitution which provide that real property taxes shall be levied uniformly
as ascertained by the General Assembly. 26 The plaintiffs also alleged that
the five percent interest imposed on back taxes constituted an unlawful pen-
alty 27 and that the farmland use valuation violated the equal protection and
due process clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions. 28  The
trial court held that the statute was unconstitutional and enjoined the de-
fendants from collecting the rollback taxes. Because the circuit court held
the statute unconstitutional, the case was appealed directly to the Illinois
Supreme Court. 29
After summarily dismissing two technical arguments based on the doctrine
of exhaustion 30 and waiver and estoppel, 31 the Illinois Supreme Court con-
22. The officer in charge of agricultural assessments testified that, although a parcel in ex-
cess of ten acres is farmed, the application may nonetheless be denied if there is a commercial
building on the parcel. In one parcel, plaintiffs were denied an agricultural valuation because
portions of the entire parcel which were still being farmed were conveyed for non-agricultural
use. Brief for appellee at 23.
23. E.g., one parcel was conveyed to a construction company and developed into single
family homes. The construction company was assessed rollback tax bills for the three years prior
to its acquisition, covering the period when the property was used for farming. Brief for appel-
lee at 6.
24. E.g., in one parcel, all of the property was farmed continuously up to the date of filing
the complaint. But because the clerk had changed the parcel number, the old parcel number
could not be identified and rollback taxes were assessed. A certificate of error was ultimately
issued the day of the trial. In another instance, the land was used for agricultural purposes up
to the time of the trial and the rollback tax bill apparently was issued because the new owners had
failed to file an application. Brief for appellee at 20.
25. 69 I11. 2d at 412, 372 N.E.2d at 77.
26. Specifically, the 1970 Illinois Constitution states that real property taxes:
(a) [s]hall be levied uniformly by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly
shall provide by law.
(b) Subject to such limitations as the General Assembly may hereafter prescribe by
law, counties with a population of more than 200,000 may classify or continue to
classify real property for purposes of taxation.
ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4.
27. 69 I11. 2d at 429, 372 N.E.2d at 87.
28. Id. at 410, 372 N.E.2d at 77.
29. Id. at 408, 372 N.E.2d at 76. The plaintiffs appealed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
302(a)(1), which states in pertinent part that appeals from final judgments of circuit courts shall
be taken directly to the Illinois Supreme Court when an Illinois statute has been held invalid.
30. Defendants argued that taxpayers who have not exhausted all administrative remedies
are barred from seeking relief in equity. The court applied an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion for the taxpayer who attacks a statute as unconstitutional, relying on the previous
decisions of I11. Bell Tele. Co. v. Allphin, 60 I11. 2d 350, 326 N.E.2d 737 (1975), and Clarendon
Assoc. v. Korzen, 56 11. 2d 101, 306 N.E.2d 299 (1973).
31. Defendants argued that the doctrine of waiver and estoppel barred the plaintiffs from
challenging the validity of a statute under which they voluntarily applied for and received ben-
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strued section 4 of the Illinois Constitution as not specifically limiting the
General Assembly's inherent power to classify real property for tax purposes.
In addition, the court asserted that judicial restraint should be exercised in
interpreting the new constitution, stating that:
We are at this period of time early in the life of the constitution. We
should not now through narrow construction make it difficult or impossible
for the legislative body at some future time to resolve revenue problems
which are not now known or foreseeable.3 2
As a result, the court held that the farmland use provision did not violate
sections 4(a) and (b) of the Illinois Constitution.
The court also had little difficulty disposing of the plaintiff's additional
arguments. It found no violations of the due process3 3 and equal protec-
tion3 4 clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions. In addition,
the court held that the five percent interest payment on back taxes was not a
penalty or punishment and, therefore, the interest was not a taking of prop-
erty without due process. Rather, the interest was both part of the legisla-
tive scheme to discourage the diversion of agricultural land to other uses and
a method of partially reimbursing the taxing bodies for the loss of revenue to
which they would have been otherwise entitled.3 5
ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
The court in Hoffmann found that the General Assembly had the authority
to raise revenue through its inherent legislative power and a specific grant
efits. The court rejected this argument by creating a new, if narrow, exception to the doctrines
of waiver and estoppel for cases which present for determination "important questions of first
impression affecting taxpayers and taxing bodies throughout the state." 69 I11. 2d at 412, 372
N.E.2d at 78.
32. Id. at 424, 372 N.E.2d at 84.
33. The court found that the rollback provisions did not deny the plaintiff's due process
because the provision was neither vague nor indefinite. Specifically, the court held that the
assessment practices in DuPage County, which prevented the plaintiffs from obtaining a farm-
land use assessment because a portion of the farm was conveyed for non-agricultural use, were a
misapplication of the statute and did not render the rollback provisions vague or indefinite.
Similarly, the court held that the plaintiffs' failure to qualify for the farmland use valuation on
their ten acre farm because the DuPage County Assessor did not assess on the basis of ten acre
parcels did not make the rollback provisions vague or indefinite.
Moreover, the court determined that the taxpayers had no right to notice and a hearing prior
to imposition of the rollback taxes since the purchaser or property taxpayer was obligated to
ascertain on what basis the land was taxed. If a parcel was wrongfully removed from its farmland
use classification, "then relief [could] be had by the traditional method of paying taxes under
protest and filing objections to the application for judgment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 675,
716 (1973)." Id. at 428, 372 N.E.2d at 86-87.
34. The court rejected the argument that the rollback tax provision deprived the plaintiffs of
equal protection because the provision taxed some agricultural property at a higher rate than
others. The court held that the legislature's division of agricultural property into two classes-
that which qualified for special treatment under §§ 501a-1 to 501a-3 and that which no longer
qualifies-was a rational exercise of legislative authority. Id. at 424-27, 372 N.E.2d at 85.
35. Id. at 429, 372 N.E.2d at 87.
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of the Revenue Article of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.36 The court also
held that the General Assembly's power to raise revenue was broad enough,
unless specifically limited by the Constitution, to include the power to clas-
sify real property for tax purposes.3 7 Although the plaintiffs alleged that
section 4 provided such a limitation, the court rejected their argument 38 and
held that sections 4(a) and (b) were not express limitations upon the broad
power to raise revenue. 39 As a result, the court found that the General
Assembly had the power to classify property for general tax purposes and to
implement the rollback provision.4 0
In determining whether sections 4(a) and (b) excluded the power to clas-
sify real estate from the Assembly's general authority to raise revenue, the
court apparently found 4 1 that it could not rely on the plain language or
meaning of those sections. Instead, the Hoffmann court determined whether
the General Assembly was prohibited from classifying property into farm and
non-farm land by interpreting constitutional intent as evinced by the debate
records of the 1970 Constitutional Convention, the proposed amendments to
the text of section 4, the report to the convention by the Committee on
Revenue and Finance, and the report of the Committee on Style, Drafting,
and Submission. The court found that since these sources did not clearly
indicate that the General Assembly was precluded from classifying real
property for tax purposes, there was no constitutional restriction on the
General Assembly's right to exercise this taxing power.
The court's interpretation of section 4, however, is questionable. In the
first step of its analysis, the court was too quick to disregard the plain mean-
ing of the language of section 4(a) which indicates that the General As-
sembly was restricted from classifying real property. The court has articu-
lated in previous cases that "[i]n determining the intention and purpose
underlying a constitutional provision the language used should be given its
plain and commonly understood meaning unless it is clearly evident that a
contrary meaning was intended." 42  Further, "[w]hen this court, prior to
the adoption of the constitution of 1970 has defined a term found therein,
sound rules of construction require that it be given the same definition un-
36. Id. at 423, 372 N.E.2d at 84.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 423-24, 372 N.E.2d at 84.
39. Id. at 424, 372 N.E.2d at 84.
40. Id. at 424, 372 N.E.2d at 85.
41. Although the court did not expressly find that these sections were ambiguous, it must
have assumed that the language was not clear because it went on to analyze the record of the
1970 Constitutional Convention.
42. Coalition v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 I11. 2d 453, 464, 359 N.E.2d 138, 143 (1976).
Coalition held invalid a proposed initiative amendment to the legislative article of the 1970
Constitution because it did not affect both the structure and the procedure of the General
Assembly. Coalition followed Homer v. Bd. of Ed., 47 I11. 2d 480, 486, 265 N.E.2d 616, 620
(1971); Locust Grove Cemetary Assn. v. Rose, 16 I11. 2d 132, 139, 156 N.E.2d 577, 581 (1959);




less it is apparent that some other meaning was intended." 4 3  Taxing laws,
in particular, are to be strictly construed, and they are "not to be extended
by implication beyond the clear import of the language used."" As stated
earlier, section 4(a) requires that real property taxes be levied "uniformly," 45
a term well defined in prior Illinois case law. 46  Thus, contrary to the hold-
ing in Hoffmann, section 4(a) should be construed on the basis of the plain
language of the constitution as interpreted by prior case law.
For example, in Bistor v. McDonough, the court noted that "[u]niformity
in taxing implies equality in the burden of taxation; and this equality cannot
exist without uniformity in the basis of assessment as well as in the rate of
taxation." 4 7 Therefore, uniformity as defined in Bistor precludes the use of
differing methods of valuation for different classes of real property, as is
done in the farmland use provisions. Although Bistor was decided prior to
enactment of section 4(a), sound rules of constitutional construction require
that the prior interpretation of "uniformity" be used to interpret section 4(a)
unless some other meaning is apparent. 48 There is no indication, however,
that "uniformity" as used in section 4(a) was clearly intended to take on a
new meaning.
During the debates of the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention, the
cases of Miller v. Doe 4 9 and Toman v. Olympia Fields Country Club 5 0 were
called to the attention of the convention by a single delegate as holding that
the requirement of uniformity of the 1870 Illinois Constitution 51 did not
43. Paper Supply Co. v. Chicago, 57 I11. 2d 553, 565, 317 N.E.2d 3, 9 (1974). In Paper
Supply Co., the Chicago Employer's Expense Tax Ordinance was held not an occupation tax
and, thus, did not violate § 6(e) of article VIII of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
44. Svithiod Singing Club v. McKibbin, 381 I1I. 194, 200, 44 N.E.2d 904, 908 (1942).
Svthiod held that a social club, which was organized as a non-profit corporation and which
served food and drink to its members but not to the public, was not subject to the Illinois
Retailers' Occupation Tax. The court followed Svithiod in Oscar L. Paris Co. v. Lyons, 8 I11. 2d
590, 598, 134 N.E.2d 755, 759 (1956) and in Hiken Furniture Co. v. City of Belleville, 53 I11.
App. 3d 306, 310, 368 N.E.2d 961, 964 (1977). The court also said in Johnson v. State Electoral
Bd., 53 Ill. 2d 256, 258-59, 290 N.E.2d 886, 888 (1972) that "the general principles applicable
to the construction of statutes similarly apply in the construction of constitutional provisions."
The court followed Johnson in Coalition v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 453, 464, 359
N.E.2d 138, 143 (1976). Thus, the court under this standard would construe the revenue article
strictly and not extend that article beyond the clear import of the language used.
45. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a). See also note 26 supra.
46. See note 47 and supporting text infra.
47. 348 I11. 624, 629, 181 N.E. 417, 419 (1932). See also note 49 and supporting text infra.
This definition of uniformity was used by the Illinois Appellate Court in 1976 when taxpayers
obtained relief from tax assessments because their property was assessed at a greater proportion
of its true value than similar property in the same taxing district. Stephens v. Property Tax
App. Bd., 42 I11. App. 3d 550, 552, 356 N.E.2d 355, 356 (1976). See also Toman v. Chicago
Union Sta. Co., 383 II1. 153, 48 N.E.2d 524 (1943).
48. See note 43 and supporting text supra.
49. 22 I11. 2d 211, 174 N.E.2d 830 (1961).
50. 374 I11. 101, 28 N.E.2d 109 (1940).
51. The 1870 Illinois Constitution states in pertinent part:
The General Assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful, by levying a
tax, by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion
1979]
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preclude the General Assembly from classifying real property. 52  The uni-
formity limitation was interpreted by this delegate to mean "only that taxes
must be equal and uniform among members of the same class." 53  How-
ever, the 1870 Illinois Constitution required uniform taxation of all realty, 54
and the above cases did not conflict with that requirement. In Miller, the
plaintiffs alleged that classification of real property into "lands" (unplatted
property) and "lots" (platted property) so as to apply a different percentage
increase to each during quadrennial assessment violated the constitutional
requirement of uniformity of taxation. However, such classification for pur-
poses of equalization was held to be not only permissible but also necessary
because it made the assessed valuation of real property uniform. 55  Without
equalization, by first classifying property and then applying a different
percentage increase to each class, "land" would be assessed at a greater
proportion of its fair cash value than "lots" in the same township. 56 Toman
v. Olympia Fields Country Club 57 could arguably stand for the proposition
that classification of real property for the purpose of non-uniform taxation
was allowed under the 1870 Constitution. Neither the court 58 nor commen-
tators,59 however, have viewed Olympia Fields as standing for that prop-
osition.
to the value of his, her, or its property ...; but the general assembly shall have the
power to tax peddlers, auctioneers ... and persons or corporations owning or using
franchises and privileges, in such manner as it shall, from time to time, direct by
general law, uniform as to the class on which it operates.
ILL. CONST. art IX, § 1 (1870).
52. 69 Ill. 2d at 419, 372 N.E.2d at 82.
53. Id.
54. C. BRADEN & R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARA-
TIVE ANALYSIS 417 (1969).
55. Miller v. Doe, 22 I11. 2d 211, 225, 174 N.E.2d 830, 837-38 (1961).
56. Id. at 225, 174 N.E.2d at 838.
57. 374 I11. 101, 28 N.E.2d 109 (1940).
58. In Olympia Fields, a country club's golfing green was assessed at a value per acre ap-
proximately twice the value of adjoining farmlands. Since the golf course had been specially
improved (e.g., by the addition of a water system worth $65,000 and a putting green worth
$50,000), the assessor had the right to take these improvements into account when determining
market value. The court cited Olympia Fields in Miller v. Doe, 22 Ill. 2d 211, 225, 174 N.E.2d
830, 837-38 (1961) and People v. S.W. Tel. Co., 377 Ill. 303, 36 N.E.2d 362 (1941) (cited in
Hofftnann as a case dealing with classification). The issue in S.W. Tel. Co. was whether the
same equalization factor had to be applied on both real and personal property to avoid violating
the 1870 Illinois Constitution. The court concluded that reducing the assessment of real prop-
erty without reducing the assessment of personal property did not violate the uniformity re-
quirement of the constitution, since real property belonged in one class and personal property
belonged in another. The court has never used Olympia Fields as precedent that uniformity
permits classification by assessment of real property on one basis and assessment of other prop-
erty on another.
59. E.g., Netsch stated that "the court loosely said that the Constitution does not prohibit
classification of property, but the facts indicate that it was dealing only with differences in value
which take into account improvements to land." Netsch, supra note 11, at 113 n.9.
[Vol. 28:849
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Hence, had the Hoffmann court applied the principal of constitutional
construction which provides that terms are given their common meaning
unless a contrary meaning is clearly intended, it would have concluded that
a contrary meaning was not clearly intended. "Uniformity" in section 4(a)
would have meant uniformity on the basis of assessment. A different basis of
assessment for a farmland by means of a classification would have been a vio-
lation of this uniformity requirement.
The court apparently determined that the language of section 4(a) was
ambiguous, for it then proceeded to consider the formal record of the 1970
Constitutional Convention to determine whether the General Assembly was
expressly limited from classifying real estate for tax purposes. This inquiry
into the constitutional intent of section 4, the second step of the Hoffmann
court's analysis, is also susceptible to challenge.
Previous decisions have frequently referred to the formal record of the
convention when construing the 1970 Constitution.6" However, not only is
the record a questionable tool to use in constitutional interpretation, but also
the court's application of the record in Hoffinann was not consistent with
prior Illinois cases. Specifically, the Official Explanation, the convention's
description of the proposed text of the Constitution in layman's language, 61
was not used to determine constitutional intent in Hoffinann.62
The court first considered the debates of the 1970 Constitutional Con-
vention. One commentator has stated, however, that the record of the de-
bates, rarely clear on anything more important than the time of luncheon
recess, 63 often can be interpreted in several ways. 64  In fact, the Hoffinann
court concluded that it was impossible to determine from the debates
whether the General Assembly was to be prohibited from classifying real
property.6 5 The Hoffmann dissent interprets the same debates as evincing a
60. Lousin, Constitutional Intent: the Illinois Supreme Court's Use of the Record in Inter-
preting the 1970 Illinois Constitution, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 189, 189-90 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Lousin].
61. Id. at 195.
62. The Official Explanation can arguably be considered part of the public's constitutional
intent concerning the question of adoption. Id. at 211-12.
63. Id. at 191.
64. See Paper Supply Co. v. Chicago, 57 I11. 2d 553, 317 N.E.2d 3 (1974) in which the
dissent disagrees with the majority about the meaning of a delegate's speech concerning end
run taxes to avoid constitutional proscriptions. The court often uses the debates in construing
the constitution. See Lousin, supra note 60, at 206-11. See also the use of the debates in
Judicial Inquiry Bd. v. Hartel, 72 I11. 2d 225, 380 N.E.2d 801 (1978); Lunding v. Walker, 65 I11.
2d 516, 359 N.E.2d 96 (1976); Scott v. Briceland, 65 Ill. 2d 485, 359 N.E.2d 149 (1976); Joliet
v. Bosworth, 64 I11. 2d 516, 356 N.E.2d 543 (1976).
65. Specifically, the convention was primarily concerned with preserving and legitimizing de
facto classification in Cook County. That is, the debates were concerned with whether classifica-
tion should be allowed at the county level. 69 III. 2d at 414-16, 372 N.E.2d at 79-80.
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definite intention that the General Assembly retain the right to enact laws
limiting the manner in which counties over 200,000 could classify, but that
no county could be required by the General Assembly to classify. 66  Thus,
Justice Underwood interprets the debates as indicating an intent to restrict
the General Assembly's power.
Not only is the record of the debates subject to multiple interpretations,
but evidence of proposed amendments is also a questionable source of de-
finitive intent 67-the same defeated amendments are interpreted differ-
ently by the court and dissent. An amendment was defeated which would
have prohibited all classification of real property for tax purposes, 6  and
another was rejected which would have prohibited all classification of any
kind in counties with populations of under two million. 69 Although the court
views these defeated amendments as a rejection of the proposition that the
General Assembly was to be prohibited from the power to classify, the dis-
sent views them as an attempt to reach a compromise between two opposing
viewpoints. To Justice Underwood, the rejected amendments do not conflict
with the idea that the convention, in reaching its compromise, clearly prohib-
ited classification by the General Assembly.
Yet another questionable source of the accurate meaning of the language
in section 4 is the Committee Reports prepared by the committee which
drafted the text of the proposed article. These reports explained the text's
purpose, changes from the 1870 Constitution, and rejected solutions to par-
ticular problems. 70 The problems of interpreting committee reports are
compounded because the convention never adopted a substantive report,
but used the reports only as background. 71 Thus, it is impossible to deter-
mine exactly what the convention itself accepted or rejected. In fact, the
court and the dissent each used the Committee Report of the Committee on
Revenue and Finance to substantiate its own position. 72
66. Justice Underwood, in dissent, reads the debates as reaching a compromise between
those wanting the General Assembly to prescribe a permissive classification scheme which any
county could adopt, those favoring classification only in larger counties, and those opposing any
classification. A compromise was reached in large part due to a recognition of the necessity to
legitimize de facto classification in Cook County. Id. at 433-34, 372 N.E.2d at 94.
67. The court often uses the amending process as an aid in interpretation. See Lousin, supra
note 60, at 209-11. See also the use of amendments proposed and defeated in Lunding v.
Walker, 65 Ill. 2d 516, 359 N.E.2d 96 (1976). Lunding held that members of the state board of
elections can only be removed for cause. Id. at 51, 359 N.E.2d at 97. In construing the Illinois
Constitution art. V, § 10, the court found that there was disagreement among the delegates,
evinced by the amendments suggested and defeated. Id. at 525-27, 359 N.E.2d at 100-01.
However, the dissent noted that it must read the action on the amendment "in the context of
the whole discussion in order to ascertain its true significance." The amendment was defeated in
order to retain the words of the 1870 Illinois Constitution and the delegates were in agreement.
Id. at 532, 359 N.E.2d at 103.
68. 69 II1. 2d at 414, 372 N.E.2d at 80.
69. Id. at 415, 372 N.E.2d at 80.
70. Lousin, supra note 60, at 192.
71. Id. at 205.
72. The court finds evidence in the Committee Report that the General Assembly was not
to be prevented in any future use of classification. 69 I11. 2d at 413-14, 372 N.E.2d at 79. The
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A final source of constitutional intent used by the court was the Report of
the Committee on Style, Drafting, and Submission (SDS). The SDS re-
drafted the solution arrived at by the Convention after a proposed article
was submitted to debate by the delegates. 73 The court, in Coalition v.
State Board of Elections,74 rejected the explanation of the SDS because it
was not a substantive committee of the Contitutional Convention but rather
a procedural one concerned only with style and form. 75  In Hoffmann, how-
ever, the court followed, albeit inconsistently, the explanation found in the
SDS report concerning the language of the Revenue Act. Specifically, the
court wanted to know the significance of the explicit and implicit grants of
authority to the General Assembly for non-property taxes in sections 2 and
5,76 as compared to the absence of the grant of authority to classify in sec-
tion 4. The court accepted the SDS explanation that sections 2 and 5 of the
Revenue Article were constitutional affirmations of authority and not grants
of power to the General Assembly. 77 However, it then rejected the SDS
explanation that section 4 contained an "opening limitation of uniformity to
which exceptions for classification are necessary." 78  Hence, the court's ap-
plication of the SDS explanation was not only inconsistent, but also ques-
tionable in light of the Coalition decision.
The court also ignored the Official Explanation, an important source for
determining the meaning of a constitutional article and one of the only parts
of the record generally available to the public before the Constitutional Ref-
erendum .79  The delegates to the convention recognized that there would
be two framers of the 1970 Constitution-the delegates would draft the con-
stitution for referendum, and the electorate would adopt the convention's
proposal. 80 The court frequently has used the Official Explanation as a
dissent, however, says that the convention rejected the idea of classification by the General
Assembly. Id. at 436, 372 N.E.2d at 90. (Underwood, J., dissenting).
73. Lousin, supra note 60, at 203.
74. 65 I11. 2d 453, 359 N.E.2d 138 (1976).
75. Id. at 471, 359 N.E.2d at 147.
76. Section 2 and Section 5 of article IX state in pertinent part:
Section 2. -Non-Property Taxes -Classification, Exemptions, Deductions, Allow-
ances and Credits:
In any law classifying the subjects or objects of non-property taxes or
fees, the classes shall be reasonable and the subjects and objects
within each class shall be taxed uniformly.
Section 5. -Personal Property Taxation
(a) The General Assembly by law may classify personal property for
purposes of taxation by valuation, abolish such taxes on any or all
classes and authorize the levy of taxes in lieu of the taxation of per-
sonal property by valuation.
ILL. CONST. art IX, §§ 2 & 5(a).
77. 69 I11. 2d at 420-21, 372 N.E.2d at 82-83.
78. Id. at 420, 372 N.E.2d at 83.
79. Lousin, supra note 60, at 211.
80. Id. at 212. Lousin points out that the debates are full of references to the "Fourth
Reading"-the first three readings would take place at the convention but the fourth would be
by the voters at the referendum.
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source of constitutional intent. 81 While it is true that the court has con-
sulted the debates of members of the convention when determining the
meaning of provisions which were thought to be doubtful, it also has
specified that "in construing the constitution, the true inquiry concerns the
understanding of the meaning of its provisions by the voters who adopted
it .... "82 Further, Justice Ryan noted in his concurring opinion in Board
of Education v. Bakalis s3 that the standard of constitutional interpretation
should be what the voters intended when they ratified the constitution be-
cause the delegates at times evaded controversial issues and were less than
candid with the electorate.8
The Hoffmann court, however, refused to consider the Official Explana-
tion of section 4.85 It is clear that the Official Explanation recognized a
general rule of uniformity of taxation based on the value of property. Clas-
sification was an exception to the rule of uniformity, permitted only in coun-
ties of more than 200,000 people. The General Assembly had the power to
regulate-not order-such classification in those counties only. Thus, the
Official Explanation indicates that the uniformity provision of section 4 is an
express limitation on the taxing power of the General Assembly. Had the
court taken the Official Explanation into account, it would have concluded
that classification under farmland use valuation was invalid.
Concededly, the court's minimal scrutiny of the General Assembly's
method of classification was consistent with earlier decisions.8 6 However,
81. Id. at 213. Cases since the 1974 Lousin article which use the Official Explanation in
construing the constitution are: Lunding v. Walker, 65 I11. 2d 516, 359 N.E.2d 96 (1976); Scott
v. Briceland, 65 Ill. 2d 485, 359 N.E.2d 149 (1976); Coalition v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 III.
2d 453, 359 N.E.2d 138 (1976); Joliet v. Bosworth, 64 I11. 2d 516, 356 N.E.2d 543 (1976); In re
Estate of Karas, 61 I11. 2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234 (1975).
82. Keenan v. McGuane, 13 II1. 2d 520, 527, 150 N.E.2d 168, 172 (1958). The court fol-
lowed Keenan in Paper Supply Co. v. Chicago, 57 I11. 2d 553, 559, 317 N.E.2d 3, 6 (1974) and
in Coalition v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 I1I. 2d 453, 467, 359 N.E.2d 138, 144-45 (1976).
83. 54 I11. 2d 448, 299 N.E.2d 737 (1973).
84. Specifically, Justice Ryan said: "It was the vote of the people which was required to
bring this constitution into existence. I am therefore concerned only with what the voters in-
tended when they voted for the adoption of the constitution. Id. at 477, 299 N.E.2d at
751.
85. The Official Explanation states that:
Any tax on real property must be uniform and based on the value of the property,
except in counties which are permitted to classify real estate for taxation purposes.
Counties with more than 200,000 population may divide real property into reason-
able classes with uniform assessments within each class, subject to regulation by the
general assembly.
7 Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention Proceedings 2736 (1970).
86. In Heyman v. Mahin, 49 III. 2d 284, 275 N.E.2d 421 (1971), the supreme court used
minimal scrutiny when the distributor of cigarettes alleged that the Cigarette Stamp Act, which
provided for a gradual rate of discount on a distributor's purchases of tax stamps, was unconsti-
tutional as violating the uniformity provision of section 1 of article IX of the 1970 Illinois Con-
stitution and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitu-
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had the Hoffmann court construed section 4 using the dual standard that the
language used in a constitutional provision should be given the same mean-
ing that it had prior to the Constitution and that taxing laws are to be strictly
construed, or had the court taken into account the Official Explanation as a
source of constitutional intent, it would have correctly concluded that the
1970 Constitution limits the General Assembly's power to classify. Thus, the
court never should have reached the question of whether the General As-
sembly's method of classification was constitutional.
IMPACT
Hoffnann sets a poor precedent. It portrays judicial inconsistency in cases
of first impression interpreting the Illinois Constitution. In construing sec-
tion 4 of the Revenue Act, the Illinois Supreme Court ignored the meaning
of that section's terms as defined in prior Illinois case law8 7 and instead
looked to portions of the formal record of the 1970 Constitutional Con-
vention 88 which were inconsistent with other cases construing the 1970
Constitution. 9  It is, therefore, difficult to predict the method of inter-
pretation the court will use in future decisions requiring construction of the
new constitution.
The impact of Hoffinann, however, goes beyond its precedential value. In
Hoffmann, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the 1970 Illinois Constitu-
tion as imposing no limits on the General Assembly's power to classify real
property for tax purposes. Accordingly, the General Assembly now has the
ability to direct counties throughout the state to tax property on a non-
uniform basis tied to land use. The court has given the General Assembly
wide latitude in the use of its power to tax not only in the area of raising
revenue, but also as a vehicle for attaining social objectives.
The impact of Hoffinann will be to legalize, and thus further, the move-
ment in Illinois to use the real property tax as both a means of subsidizing
certain landowners and a method of regulating the use of land. Indeed, be-
tween the enactment of the farm use valuation in 1971 and the Hoffmann
tion. The court upheld the constitutionality of the Cigarette Stamp Act, stating that the plaintiffs
had failed to show that the classification was arbitrary or capricious.
Likewise, in Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 53 Ill. 2d 421, 292 N.E.2d 401 (1973), the plaintiffs
challenged the validity of the Chicago Parking Tax Ordinance, which exempted certain residen-
tial parking from the tax, as an unreasonable classification. The court held that the powers of the
legislative body to make classifications, particularly in the field of taxation, are very broad and
the classification must be upheld if any set of circumstances can reasonably be formulated to
support that classification. Thus, "[t]here is a presumption favoring the validity of the classifica-
tion and the one assailing it has the burden of showing that the classification is arbitrary." 69 I11.
2d at 425, 372 N.E.2d at 85. Further, "[the reasons justifying the classification need not appear
on the face of the statute, and the classification must be upheld if any state of facts can reason-
ably be conceived that would sustain it." 69 Ill. 2d at 425, 372 N.E.2d at 85.
87. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
88. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 79-85 and accompanying text supra.
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decision, the General Assembly mandated that other types of real property
be classified. 90 In addition, the 1976 House Republican Staff reported legis-
lative receptiveness to the use of classification and special valuation to pro-
mote land use. 9 1 For example, in order to help Illinois attract and retain
industry, a proposal was made for mandatory deferment of any increased
valuation on real property improved for industrial purposes until two years
after completion. 92  Another proposal suggested exempting improvements
on residential homes from taxation to provide an incentive to residential
homeowners, especially those living in deteriorated areas, to renovate their
houses without increased taxes. 93  The legislature's eagerness to resort to
classification to achieve social objectives, coupled with the Hoffmann court's
interpretation of section 4 of the Revenue Act, can only further a question-
able means of subsidizing selected taxpayers and regulating land use. Thus,
the impact of the Hoffmann case extends well beyond the mere classification
of farmland for tax purposes. The court, by broadly construing section 4 to
allow the General Assembly to classify property, has opened wide the door
to state-mandated classification of all real property for tax purposes.
Although there are certain goals to be achieved through classification, it
has been extensively criticized as having no economic justification. 94  In
other words, classification disregards principles of equity in that it provides
tax relief to some by shifting the tax burden to other property owners within
the taxing district. 95 To the extent that other property owners are not com-
pensated for this tax shift, classification erodes the local tax base. 96
90. Classes mandated since 1971 are: (1) land used for airport purposes in counties with a
population over 200,000 together with a three-year rollback tax and five percent interest charge,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 501b-1 to 501b-3 (Supp. 1977); (2) condominiums and cooperatives
in counties with a population exceeding 200,000 to be assessed on the same basis as single
family residences, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501c-1 (Supp. 1977); (3) alternate valuation of
improvements in property heated or cooled by solar energy, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501d-3
(Supp. 1977); (4) Farmland Value Assessment, an alternative to §§ 501a-1 to 501a-3, which
specifies that any farm owner is eligible for farm value assessment and provides a method of
computation of that value, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501e (Supp. 1977); (5) land used for open
space purposes together with a three year rollback tax and five percent interest charge, except
in counties with a population over 200,000, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 501g-1 to 501g-3
(Supp. 1977); (6) land with residential maintenance and repairs not exceeding $7500 in counties
with less than 3,000,000 inhabitants, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501h-1 (Supp. 1977); and (7)
land containing pollution control facilities, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 502a-1 to 502a-3 (Supp.
1977).
91. HOUSE REPUBLICAN STAFF REPORT, THE PROPERTY TAx: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES
24-27 (1977).
92. Id. at 29-30.
93. Id. at 28.
94. See FISHBANE, supra note 10, at 77; HATFIELD, supra note 6, at 11-31. See also notes
5-9 and accompanying text supra.
95. ATTOE, supra note 3, at 24; Denne, Explicit Tax Policies and the Promotion of Specific
Land-Use and Economic Development Objectives: A Review, 11 ASSESSOR'S J. 13 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Denne]. Denne states that "[tlhe experience gained from property tax systems of
the traditional sort suggests that they are first and foremost politically popular soak-the-rich
schemes . . . only incidentally thought to have economic development consequences." Denne
supra at 44-45.
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Classification also has been criticized on the theory that lowering the taxes
on some property creates a hidden subsidy for that property owner.9 7 The
Hoffinann court correctly pointed out that without farmland use valuation,
taxes would far exceed the value of agricultural products produced on the
land.98 Thus, a subsidy may be necessary for the continued economic via-
bility of an enterprise such as farming. It is questionable, however, whether
lowering property taxes is the best method of subsidization. Classifying
property, instead of providing direct subsidies, has the disadvantages of ad-
ministrative problems and record keeping costs.99 Moreover, while classifi-
cation may be politically advantageous in that it reduces the visibility of the
Another commentator has stated that the local community bears the burden of the tax rev-
enue loss resulting from lower taxes on the agricultural land. Ellingson, Differential Assessment
and Local Government Controls to Preserve Agricultural Lands, 20 S.D. L. REV. 548, 555
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Ellingson]. Others in accord include: THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY, UNTAXING OPEN SPACE: AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DIF-
FERENTIAL ASSESSMENT OF FARMS AND OPEN SPACE 118 (1976) [hereinafter cited as UNTAXING
OPEN SPACE]; Hagman, Open Space Planning and Property Taxation-Some Suggestions, 1964
WIS. L. REV. 628, 657; HATFIELD, supra note 6, at 11-27; Keene, supra note 16, at 38. These
authors' arguments regarding the inequities which result from classification should be particu-
larly compelling with respect to lower assessed valuation of public and private golf courses. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 501g-1 to 501g-3 (Supp. 1977).
96. See P. ALYEA, "INDUCEMENTS TO INDUSTRY," PROPERTY TAXATION U.SA. (R. Lind-
holm ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as ALYEA]; HATFIELD, supra note 6, at 11-19; LADD, supra
note 7, at 9; See also C. PETERSON, THE PROPERTY TAX AND Low INCOME HOUSING MAR-
KETS, PROPERTY TA REFORM (G. Peterson ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as PETERSON], for an
examination of the empirical validity of the assumption that the local property tax badly distorts
the operation of housing markets in blighted areas.
97. Adamson, Preferential Land Assessment in Virginia, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 111, 112
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Adamson]; HATFIELD, supra note 6, at 11-18; Keene, supra note 95,
at 28; Cooke & Powers, Preferential Assessment of Agricultural Land, 47 FLA. B.J. 636, 639
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Cooke].
98. For example, one parcel in 1973 was valued for farming or agricultural purposes at
$17,930 for a 34.83 acre tract or $514.79 per acre; the tax based on this valuation is $35.08 per
acre. The fair market value of this same parcel in 1973 was $210,840 or $6,053.40 per acre; the
tax based on fair market value would have been $412.48 per acre. Another parcel in 1973 was
valued for farming or agricultural purposes at $400.00 per acre; the tax based on agricultural use
valuation was $26.95 per acre. The fair cash value of the parcel was $9,600.00 per acre and the
tax based on fair market value would have been $654.14 per acre. The gross income per acre in
1975 of the major cash crops in DuPage County was: Corn-$219.79 per acre; Soy Beans-
$145.38 per acre; Wheat-$176.22 per acre; Oats-$87.28 per acre; Hay (baled)-$120.96 per acre.
Brief and Argument for amicus curiae, Illinois Agricultural Association at 23, Appendix B.
But see Keene, supra note 16, at 26-28 for an examination of influence of the land market and
the real property tax system on the magnitude of the tax benefits received from differential
taxation. Keene's study shows that farmers not on the urban-rural fringe would enjoy a smaller
percentage reduction than those cited by the amicus brief. Also, use value assessments can have
a greater impact on a per acre basis in an expanding area than in an already densely settled
area. See Estimating the Probable Impact of Preferential Assessments in Illinois, Research and
Technical Services Dep't. (rev. ed. 1975).
99. HATFIELD, supra note 6, at 11-27, 11-102; D. NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY
TAX 207 (1966) [hereinafter cited as NETZER].
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subsidy, any deviation from the normal, accepted property tax structure
should be viewed as a tax expenditure and, thus, undergo the same critical
evaluation as a direct government expenditure. 10 0
Employing classifications to influence private sector decision-making in
land development and land use also has been criticized. In general, "tax
breaks are often blunt instruments that are unsuited for targeting specific
behavior or groups of people." 101 Property taxes are only a small fraction of
the market value of property and, therefore, do not influence the use of land
in any particular way or intensity. 102
For example, experiments in classifying land to maintain farmland use
have been unsuccessful in the long run. 10 3 As indicated by recent
studies,' 04 farmland use valuation, with or without a tax rollback, has not
been effective in preserving farmland and open space. 10 5 The change from
agricultural to non-agricultural uses is motivated not by property tax levels,
but primarily by the landowner's life-cycle considerations, such as health,
estate planning, capital gains tax, and labor supply conditions. 10 6  When, as
a result of these life-cycle considerations, the farmer decides to sell, urban
uses will generally outbid agricultural uses.' 0 7  That is, bids for land on the
urban fringe are higher than what the land is worth for agricultural uses
100. LADD, supra note 7, at 8. See ADAMSON, supra note 97, at 121; S. SURREY, PATHWAYS
TO TAX REFOiRM 143-44 (1973) (Surrey's discussion is in terms of the federal income tax but the
analysis extends to property taxation as well).
101. LADD, supra note 7, at 9.
102. Id.
103. STENEHJEM, supra note 7, at 37-38; Von Bories, Local Finance and Community De-
velopment, 30 J. AM. INST. PLAN. 34, 40 (1964).
104. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 95; R. GLOUDEMANS, USE-VALUE FARMLAND AS-
SESSMENTS: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND IMPACT (1974). Gloudemans' study of the impact of the
farmland use valuations in several states contains extensive comparisons of different statutory
and constitutional farmland use valuation provisions. See also Keene, supra note 16 for various
conclusions drawn from empirical studies done in several states of the effect of Farmland Use
Valuation on the real estate market. For example, most of the participants in a Washington
study reported that lower taxes under the Washington program (which included a rollback pro-
vision) did not have any effect on their decision to sell the land or change its use. In a New
Jersey study, 56% of the buyers and 59% of the sellers of farmland said that the New Jersey
Farmland Assessment Act had no influence on their decisions. Id. at 43.
105. The court obviously was misled into correlating widespread attention given in the
periodicals of the problem of fast disappearance of agricultural land with the effectiveness of the
legislative action taken to remedy the problem. The consensus in the periodicals is that: "prefer-
ential assessment is ineffective in discouraging urban development of farmland .... When the
economic pressure is strong, the rollback provisions of deferred taxation and restrictive agree-
ment methods . . . will have little deterrent effect." Ellingson, supra note 95, at 573. See
Adamson, supra note 97, at 112; Cooke, supra note 97, at 639; Comment, Property Taxation of
Agricultural and Open Space Land, 8 HARv. J. LEGIS. 158, 169-70 (1970); Note, Preferential
Property Tax Treatment of Farmland and Open Space under Michigan Law, 8 U. MICH. J. L.
REF. 428, 446 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Preferential Property Tax Treatment).
106. Denne, supra note 95, at 39; Keene, supra note 16, at 42-43.
107. Keene, supra note 16, at 45.
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because buyers can develop the land and sell it at a higher price for residen-
tial, industrial or commercial purposes.' 08 Moreover, when the farmer de-
cides to sell, the farmland use valuation may also benefit and encourage land
speculators, who can avoid taxes by conducting very minimal farming opera-
tions while waiting for the city to grow toward or around the property and
increase the land's market value.' 0 9 Granted, there are a certain number of
farmers on the urban fringe who will continue farming because of lower
property taxes (those whose net returns will be shifted from insufficient to
sufficient). However, the effect of keeping certain property off the market
while neighboring property is being bought up for urban uses is a
"hopscotch pattern of urban sprawl." 110 Thus, differential taxation of farm-
land has been criticized in that it forces a city in the short run to leapfrog
over deferred property and create subdivisions which are not contiguous to
the principal urban area. As a result, an uneconomic urban sprawl is created
which greatly raises the cost of local government services. 11 '
A further impact of Hoffmann is that the General Assembly may now
order the use of property taxation in an attempt to influence the locational
decisions of industry. 112 Property taxes, however, have been found to be
relatively inconsequential at the regional and state levels as a means of in-
fluencing such industrial decisions. 113 Non-tax factors such as the location of
raw materials, markets, and labor tend to be more influential in a firm's
selection of a particular region." 4  In addition, it has been argued that the
reason for the lack of priority of property tax factors is that higher property
taxes can be passed along to the consumer and are deductible as a part of
the cost of operation.115
The Hoffinann case also legalizes the legislative use of property classifica-
tion and taxation to influence decisions of the private sector with regard to
108. Id. at 27.
109. HATFIELD, supra note 6, at 11-87. See Adamson, supra note 97, at 112; ATTOE, supra
note 3, at 22; Ellingson, supra note 95, at 55; Preferential Property Tax Treatment, supra note
105, at 639.
110. Adamson, supra note 97, at 120.
111. Id.; HATFIELD, supra note 6, at 11-87, 11-88; LADD, supra note 7, at 9.
112. See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
113. See ALYEA, supra note 96, at 146; Denne, supra note 95, at 32-33; J. Due, Studies of
State-Local Tax Influences on Location of Industry, 14 NAT. TAX J. 163, 171 (1961); L. Mitch-
ell, The Advantages and Disadvantages of Differing Levels of Assessment for Commercial and
Residential Properties, 1 ASSESSOR'S J. 17, 24 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Mitchell]; STENEHJEM,
supra note 7, at 67; D. ZARNOCH, EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF A CLASSIFIED PROPERTY TAX: THE
WEST VIRGINIA CASE 48 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ZARNOCHI; Montana Legislative Council,
Property Taxation and the Montana Property Classification Law: A Report to the Thirty-ninth
Legislative Assembly 23 (1964). See also Denne, supra note 95, at 33 (the impact of local rate
differentials on industrial location has not been measured accurately and may not be accurately
measurable).
114. ALYEA, supra note 96, at 147; State-Local Taxation and Industrial Location, United
States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 68 (1967).
115. Mitchell, supra note 113, at 23-24.
19791
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
home ownership. 116 However, the few empirical tests conducted in this
area have failed to show a correlation between property taxes and home
ownership decisions. It has not been shown that lowering taxes on owner-
occupied homesteads encourages home ownership. 1 7 Conversely, higher
taxes on second or seasonal homes do not appear to discourage owner-
ship." l8  Differential taxation of residential property seems not to generate
long-run land use trade-offs between residential and non-residential prop-
erty. 119
As a further consequence of Hoffmann, the General Assembly is now em-
powered to utilize classification in the battle against urban deterioration.' 2 0
The use of property taxation to curb urban blight, however, has likewise
been found to be largely ineffective. The prospect of increased property
taxes is not a disincentive to housing improvements. 121 The property tax
has minimal impact on the decision to maintain, upgrade, or abandon low
income housing structures. 122 Factors such as neighborhood deterioration,
inability to raise rents, lack of financing, racial considerations, and personal
compatibility of landlord and tenant have greater influence.123 Experiments
with tax abatement have not elicited a significant amount of private market
investment in low income neighborhoods-either in new construction or in
upgrading existing housing stock. 124 Moreover, the burden of the property
tax does not in general contribute to the flight to the suburbs. 125 Criticism
of the property tax system in urban areas has centered not on the present
tax system, but on the failure to re-assess property downward in line with
depreciating capital values; this is true in both the blighted neighborhood
and in the transitional downward neighborhood. 126 Classification, however,
116. See notes 90, 93, and accompanying text supra.
117. HATFIELD, supra note 6, at 11-27.
118. Id. at 11-31. Taxes on second homes in Minnesota are higher than on non-seasonal
homes, yet Minnesota ranks fourth nationally in the number of seasonal homes per capita.
119. ZARNOGH, supra note 113, at 94-95. Zarnoch finds that differential tax treatment of
residential property is capable of generating only short run land use trade-offs from residential
to non-residential use.
120. See notes 90, 93, and accompanying text supra.
121. A Study of Property Taxes and Urban Blight: Report to the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development at 6 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as HUD]. Peterson points out that
most improvements to the housing stock do not result in reassessment; the greatest deterrent
has been neighborhood deterioration and inability to raise rents. PETERSON, supra note 96, at
115.
Minnesota provided delayed assessment of housing improvements for six years to encourage
improvement in ghetto or decaying problem areas of metropolitan cities. However, there were
few applications from slum areas-most were from high value residential areas and for seasonal
home improvements. See HATFIELD, supra note 6, at 11-102.
122. PETERSON, supra note 96, at 113, 115. The author hypothesizes that high property taxes
may exert the greatest influence on low income housing stock through deterioration of mainte-
nance standards that come with a cash flow shortage. Id. at 124.
123. Id. at 115, 121.
124. Id. at 117.
125. HUD, supra note 121, at 8.
126. Id. at 8; PETERSON, supra note 96, at 110.
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has not been found to be a cure for illegal assessments.1 27 Thus, the Gen-
eral Assembly's use of classification to cure urban blight may be constitu-
tional after Hoffmann, but its effectiveness is doubtful.
ALTERNATIVES TO LAND USE CLASSIFICATION
Property taxation is being used in Illinois to achieve two revenue goals-
influencing land use decisions and subsidizing selected property owners;
however, it is not an effective instrument for bringing about these goals.
They would be better achieved through legislation which separates the ob-
jectives of subsidy from land use control. 128  If it is the legislature's desire
to subsidize a class of property owners such as farmers, a direct subsidy paid
through state funds would be preferable to a subsidy achieved through lower
property taxes. A state mandate for lower taxes on selected classes of prop-
erty would likely cause an erosion of the local tax base, and any such loss of
revenue would have to be made up by others within the local taxing dis-
trict.'12 A direct subsidy paid through state funds, however, would not
weaken the local district's tax base. Further, unlike the wealth distribution
achieved through property tax classification, the revenues used to subsidize
would be highly visible130 and could be reviewed frequently by the legisla-
ture to determine if the amount or type of subsidization is still desirable.
The goal of influencing land use would be better achieved through direct
measures such as a separate land use statute rather than through property
taxation. A state-level commission should be appointed to establish a com-
prehensive approach to land use.' 3 ' The commission could not only identify
and articulate Illinois' land use objectives and the order of their priority, but
also determine those which would be directed appropriately at the regional
or state level. It also might identify and recommend sources of funds as well
as mechanisms for enforcement. Finally, the comprehensive plan could be
coordinated with those of the federal government and neighboring states.
Property classification may well be one tool of such a comprehensive plan,
but its use as the sole tool clearly has been a failure.
127. R. HATFIELD, Minnesota's Experience with Classification, THE PROPERTY TAX: PROB-
LEMS AND POTENTIALS 239, 247 (1966); Netsch, supra note 11, at 113 n.12.
128. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, DIFFERENTIAL TAXATION AND AG-
RICULTURAL LAND USE 19 (2d ed. 1978).
129. See note 96 and accompanying text supra. Alternatively, the local government can oper-
ate on a reduced level by limiting local services.
130. Id.
131. The General Assembly recently created the Illinois Futures Task Force (H.B. 2000),
which has a two year mandate to evaluate and articulate state goals and objectives and to rec-
ommend an agenda for implementing actions. The main thrust of the Task Force will be in the
areas of economic development and conservation of natural and man-made resources. However,
it also will consider land use in Illinois. Hopefully, the Task Force is a prelude to a legislative
commission with a specific mandate to provide a comprehensive plan for land use in Illinois.
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CONCLUSION
In Hoffmann the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the 1970 Illinois
Constitution as allowing the General Assembly the power to mandate state-
wide classification of real property for tax purposes. Thus, Illinois in all
probability can look forward to increasing numbers of real property classes.
Classification, however, is an administratively cumbersome and politically
inexpedient means of achieving the goal of subsidy. Moreover, it has proved
to be unsuccessful in achieving land use or development related goals. At
best, Illinois has chosen an ineffective technique of influencing private sector
decision-making, and at worst, has embarked on a politically palatable course
of tax favoritism. Hopefully, despite the decision in Hoffmann, the legisla-
ture will soon recognize that property taxation alone cannot attain the goals
of raising revenue, providing subsidies, and controlling land use. More effec-
tive mechanisms for achieving these ends may then be developed.
Kay L. Pomeranz
